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LEGISLATIVE COMMENT
THE "LONG-ARM" STATUTE: WYOMING
EXPANDS JURISDICTION OF THE STATE
COURTS OVER NON-RESIDENTS
The traditional common law basis of jurisdiction over
the person is personal service on the defendant while he is
present within the territorial limits of the state in which the
court sits.' In explaining this fundamental doctrine, which
was established in Pennoyer v. Neff,2 Mr. Justice Holmes
said, "the foundation of jurisdiction is physical power." '
As the nation's population increased, transportation
methods improved, interstate commerce increased, and the
amount of litigation between residents of different states
increased. The assets and business of corporations, which
carried on the bulk of interstate business, were, then as now,
often located outside the state of incorporation. The necessity for the courts to devise a method by which in personam
jurisdiction could be obtained over these corporations was
instrumental in setting in motion the process of expanding
the limitations on jurisdictional authority.
Three methods of acquiring jurisdiction over foreign
corporations were developed. The first of these was the
traditional basis of consent. As a condition for permission
to do business within a state a corporation was required to
appoint an agent to receive process. If such an appointment
was not made jurisdiction was justified on the basis of "implied consent.'" The second theory to be applied was the
"presence" theory which was based on the concept that by
doing sufficient business within a state a corporation becomes "present" there and is therefore amenable to its
authority.5 The third theory, basically an extension of the
second, was the "doing business" theory which necessitated
that the courts determine whether the corporation was doing
a sufficient amount of business within a state to justify in
personam jurisdiction in that state.'
1.

CHEATHAM, GOODRICH, GRiswoLD & REEsE, CONFLICT OF LAWS 94 (4th ed.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

1957).
95 U.S. 714 (1877).
McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917).
Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French, 59 U.S. 404 (1856).
Philadelphia & Reading R.R. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917).
GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 73(7), at 127 (4th ed. 1964).
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Similar development took place with regard to personal
jurisdiction over natural persons primarily on the basis of
"consent" and the "power to exclude." In the case of Hess
v. Pawloski7 the Supreme Court held that, inasmuch as automobiles were dangerous instruments, the state had the power
to regulate its highways and could therefore require a nonresident to appoint an agent to receive process before using
its highways. By virtue of using the highways the nonresident motorist "consented" to such an appointment. The
"agent" usually was the Secretary of State.'
The trend toward broadening a state's in personam jurisdiction was substantially advanced in the landmark case of
InternationalShoe v. State of Washington.' In that case the
Supreme Court swept away the old theories and the legal
fictions upon which they were based when it stated that "due
process requires only that in order to subject a defendant
to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the
territory of the forum, he has certain minimum contacts with
it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."'" The
test is basically one of reasonableness which takes into consideration all the relevant factors of the particular case.
THE PURPOSE OF LONG ARm STATUTES

InternationalShoe ushered in a new era in personal jurisdiction doctrine by vastly expanding the constitutional limitations of the due process clause. However, state courts are
not required to exercise personal jurisdiction to the extent
constitutionally permissible under InternationalShoe." Those
states which had statutes based on the consent, presence, or
doing business doctrines found that their statutes fell far
short of the constitutional barriers. Some state courts
attempted to broaden their statutes by reinterpreting them in
7. 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
8. With the exception of Hess v. Pawlaci, most of the landmark decisions
concerning personal jurisdiction involve corporations. As a result it has
been suggested that the rationale of International Shoe is limited to corporations. The courts, however, have made it clear that these decisions
apply to individuals as well as corporations. See, e.g., Owens v. Superior
Court of Los Angeles County, 52 Cal. 2d 822, 345 P.2d 921 (1959).
9. 826 U.S. 310 (1945).
10. Id. at 316 (emphasis added).
11. Perkins v. Benquet Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
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light of InternationalShoe. 2 Others refused to do so. In an
effort to expand personal jurisdiction to constitutional limits,
several states passed new statutes which came to be known,
appropriately, as "long arm" statutes.
THE WYOMING "LONG

ARM"

STATUTE

Inasmuch as the states which first passed "long arm"
statutes did so independently, the statutory bases for jurisdiction are not uniform from state to state. This lack of
uniformity has been problematical as have variations in
procedure as well as in substantive law. For these reasons
the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State
Laws promulgated the Uniform International and Interstate
Procedure Act.1" The Uniform Act was designed to promote
uniformity in state "long arm" statutes and to go to the full
constitutional limits of due process as established by the
Supreme Court. The Wyoming Legislature, in 1967, adopted
sections 1.01, 1.03, and 1.04 of Article I of the Uniform Act
as follows:
Section 5-4.1 PERSONAL JURISDICTION"PERSON DEFINED." -As used in this act, "person" includes an individual or his executor, administrator or other personal representative, or a corportion, partnership, association, or any other legal or
commercial entity, whether or not a citizen or domiciliary of this state and whether or not organized
under the laws of this state.
Section 5-4.2 SAME-PERSONAL JURISDICTION WHERE OTHERWISE NOT PROVIDED BY LAW.-(a) In addition to all other
bases of jurisdiction otherwise authorized or provided by law, any court of this state may exercise
personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly
or by an agent, as to a claim for relief arising from
the person's
(i) transacting any business in this state;
(ii) contracting to supply services or things in
this state;
(iii) causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this state;
12. See, e.g., Benson, Jr. v. Brattleboro Retreat, 103 N.H. 28, 164 A.2d 560
(1960).
13. 9B UNIFORM LAws ANN. 307 (1966).
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(iv) causing tortious injury in this state by an
act or omission outside this state if he regularly
does or solicits business, or engages, in any other
persistent course of conduct in this state or derives
substantial revenue from goods consumed or services
used in this state;
(v) having an interest in, using, or possessing
real property in this state; or
(vi) contracting to insure any person, property,
or risk located within this state at the time of
contracting.
(b) When jurisdiction over a person is based
solely upon this section, only a claim for relief
arising from acts enumerated in this section may be
asserted against him.
Section 5-4.3 SAME-SERVICE OF PROCESS OUTSIDE STATE.-When the exercise of
personal jurisdiction is authorized by this act, service
may be made outside this state and may be proved
according to the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure,
the law of the place in which the person is served,
or on any order of the court.
Much of the remainder of the Uniform Act, not adopted by
Wyoming, is in substance identical to the Wyoming Rules
of Civil Procedure.
DUE PROCESS
regard
to
section 5-4.2(a) (1) of
The central issue with
the act and, to a lesser degree, with regard to all of the other
provisions of section 5-4.2(a), is the interpretation of "minimal contacts" as used in InternationalShoe. More specifically, the question raised is whether a single act or transaction
is sufficient to satisfy the minimal contacts requirement.
The leading Supreme Court case holding that the due process
clause is not violated by the assertion of jurisdiction on the
basis of a single act or transaction is McGee v. International
Life Ins. Co. 4 In McGee the Court held that servicing a
simple insurance policy by mail was enough to constitute
"minimal contact" and further, that the state had a substantial interest in controlling the insurance industry within the
state. Reference to the "substantial interest" of the state
indicates that it is the quality of the acts rather than the
MINIMUM CONTACT AND

14. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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quantity that is determinative for purposes of jurisdiction."'
As was said in InternationalShoe: "Whether due process is
satisfied must depend upon the quality and nature of the
activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of
the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause
to insure."'"
On the other hand, the Supreme Court, just one year
after McGee, stated that, while the trend was toward expanding personal jurisdiction over non-residents as a result of
greatly increased interstate commerce and rapid progress in
communication and transportation, it is a mistake to assume
that this trend "heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions
on the personal jurisdiction of state courts. It is essential in
each case that there be some act by which the defendant
purposely avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protection of its courts." 7
Considered together the McGee and Hanson cases have
resulted in a rather wide divergence of opinion in state and
federal courts. Some courts say that Hanson limits personal
jurisdiction, particularly with regard to single acts or transactions, and distinguish McGee on the grounds that it pertains to the "special" matter of state control over the insurance industry. Others say that McGee clearly upholds the
validity of personal jurisdiction in single act cases. In a
recent case the Supreme Court of Arizona expressed the view
that Hanson involved an unusual situation in which the court
achieved substantial justice and is "of questionable value as
a precedent regarding the problem of personal jurisdiction
over non-resident defendants. "s The court pointed out that
the language requiring that a defendant "purposefully" avail
itself of conducting activities within the forum state before
personal jurisdiction can be maintained cannot be construed
literally because to do so would be to revitalize the "implied
consent" theory which was done away with by International
15. Hamilton National Bank of Chattanooga v. Russell, 261 F. Supp. 145 (E.D.
Tenn. 1966).
16. International Shoe v. State of Washington, supra note 9.
17. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
18. Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732, 735
(1966).
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Shoe and to reverse the trend expanding state jurisdiction
over non-residents. 9
The United States Supreme Court has never ruled on a
"long arm" statute which predicates jurisdiction of a state
on a single act."° In considering whether the Court would
uphold such a statute some courts2 1 have noted that in footnote 2 of the McGee opinion referral was made, apparently
with approval, to Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp.2 2
which upheld a statute basing jurisdiction upon the commission of a single tort within the state, and to Compania de
Astral, S. A. v. Boston Metals Co."2 which upheld a statute
basing jurisdiction upon the making of a single contract
within the state. The view that the Court would uphold a
statute granting jurisdiction based upon a single act was
strengthened by the opinion of Mr. Justice Goldberg, acting
as a single justice, in Rosenblatt v. American Cyanamid Co.24
Although he did not directly decide the question of the due
process validity of single act statutes, Justice Goldberg stated
that the logic of the InternationalShoe and McGee decisions
supports the validity of state "long arm" statutes. He further pointed out that these statutes have been consistently upheld in state and federal courts.
The leading Wyoming case on in personam jurisdiction
5 In that
over non-residents is Ford Motor Co. v. Arguello."
case Justice Gray, in applying International Shoe, Hanson,
and McGee, stated that:
So long as the activities of a foreign corporation
are sufficiently qualitative in nature and extent reasonably to show "minimal contact" with the state and
state law on the subject is justly construed and
applied to reach those activities for jurisdictional
purposes under "traditional motions of fair play and
substantial justice," all demands of due process are
satisfied.2 6
19. Id.
20. The only Supreme Court decisions relative to jurisdiction based on a single
act are those pertaining to "implied consent" statutes. See, e.g., Hess v.
Pawlaski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
21. Beck v. Spindler, 256 Minn. 543, 99 N.W.2d 670 (1959).
22. 116 Vt. 568, 80 A.2d 664 (1951).
23. 205 Md. 237, 107 A.2d 357 (1954).
24. 86 S. Ct. 1 (1965).
25. 382 P.2d 886 (Wyo. 1963).
26. Id. at 895.
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Although it may be argued that Arguello implies that it will
usually take more than a single act to justify jurisdiction over
a foreign corporation, a single act may still be sufficient to
justify jurisdiction over a non-resident so long as that act
is of "sufficiently qualitative nature" so as to constitute
"minimal contact." Furthermore, it must be remembered
that Arguello was decided before the Wyoming Legislature
expressed its intention to broaden personal jurisdiction to
the constitutional limits set by the Supreme Court.
TRANSACTING ANY

BusINEss IN THIs STATE

The scope of this provision depends upon how it is interpreted by the courts. It is derived from the Illinois "long
arm" statute and has been interpreted by Illinois as giving
its courts power over non-residents to the extent permitted
by the due process clause. 7 This interpretation is consonant
with the general purpose of the "long arm" statute. The
issue, then, becomes one of determining whether or not the
test of "minimal contacts" has been met. It should be noted
that this test does not lend itself to the promulgation of a
formula which will automatically determine every case. As
stated in numerous cases dealing with due process, validity,
and applicability of "long arm" statutes, each case must be
2
decided on its own facts.
Although this provision has been applied in actions in
tort,29 it is most often applied in actions in contract. In
Wisconsin Metal & Chemical Corp. v. Dezurik Corp. ° a Minnesota corporation was sued in Wisconsin. The only contact
with the state was through an independent manufacturer's
representative who solicited orders for defendant and forwarded them to defendant's offices in Minnesota. Defendant
would accept the offer and ship the goods into Wisconsin.
The court held that suit in Wisconsin was not a violation of
due process.
27. Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 278, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
28. Consolidated Laboratories, Inc. v. Shandon Scientific Co., 384 F.2d 797
(7th Cir. 1967).
29. Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d
68 (1965).
30. 222 F. Supp. 119 (E.D. Wis. 1963).
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A 1967 Illinois case held that the applicability of the
transacting-any-business provision does not require the physical presence in Illinois of a non-resident or his agent.3
The inclusion of the word "any" in this provision of the
statute adds weight to the contention that in personam jurisdiction over a non-resident can be based on a single act.
CONTRACTING TO SUTPPLY SERVICES OR THINGS IN THIS STATE

This is a -very broad provision. It authorizes jurisdiction
over a defendant who has never been in the state if he has
contracted to supply services or things in the state. Inasmuch
as the provision does not state that the contract must be made
with the injured party it is conceivable that jurisdiction could
be obtained even though the injured person is not a party
to the contract."2 In addition it is not necessary that the
contract be partially or wholly perfected in the state, but
merely that services or things be supplied in the state as a
result of that contract. All that is required is that the claim
for relief arise from the defendant's contract to supply
services or things in the state.
The "contract" provision and the transacting-any-business provision overlap to some degree and are frequently
applied interchangeably by the courts. In fact, some states
do not have the "contract" provision in their "long arm"
statutes. As a result they find it necessary to stretch the
transacting-any-business provision to include contract cases."
Obviously, a much stronger case can be made for personal
jurisdiction in contract cases when the applicable "long arm"
statute includes this provision. In Waukesha Building Corp.
v. Jameson 4 a Wisconsin corporation contracted to supply
valves to be used in the air conditioning and heating unit of
an Arkansas motel. The valves were shipped by common
carrier to the job site in Arkansas and installed by a subcontractor. When the motel owner discovered that the valves
31. Ziegler v. Houghton-Mifflin Co., 80 Iii. App. 2d 210, 224 N.E.2d 12 (1967).
32. See, e.g., Coreil v. Pearson, 242 F. Supp. 802 (W.D. La. 1965).
33. In Clinic Masters, Inc. v. McCollar, 269 F. Supp. 395 (D. Colo. 1967). The
court allowed jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant who had contracted
with plaintiff, a Colorado resident, to attend a training session for chiropractors in Colorado and to share any increase in income resulting from
attendance at the sessions. Plaintiff brought suit when defendant terminated
the contract. Although the Colorado "long arm" statute does not have a
contract provision, the court stretched the transacting-any-business provision
to include the contract.
34. 246 F. Supp. 183 (D. Ark. 1965).
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did not function properly he complained to the manufacturer
who sent one of his engineers to Arkansas to inspect the
valves. After his inspection the engineer agreed to supply the
sub-contractor with another set of valves. Subsequently a
third set of valves was installed by an Arkansas contractor
hired for the job by the manufacturer. In denying the manufacturer's motion to quash service the Arkansas court mentioned the transacting-any-business provision of the Arkansas
"long arm" statute but based its decision that the manufacturer was subject to the jurisdiction of Arkansas courts primarily on the contract to supply services and goods within
Arkansas.
Some states, requiring more than was required in Waukesha Building Corp., have held that acts must be continuous
in order for this provision to justify jurisdiction over a nonresident. 5 However, in view of the purpose of the "long arm"
statute and the suggestion of the National Conference of
Commissioners that these provisions should be construed
liberally, it is submitted that a single act under this section
should be sufficient.
CAUSING ToETIous INJURY BY AN ACT OR OIISSION
IN THIS STATE

When a defendant's act or omission and the resulting
injury both occur in Wyoming, there is clearly a sufficient
contact for personal jurisdiction. This is the basis upon
which the non-resident motorist cases have been upheld. There
has been a big gap in the personal jurisdiction of the state
over persons who enter Wyoming and cause injury by a
single act not arising out of the use of the highways. One of
the purposes of this provision of the "long arm" statute is
to close that gap. A provision of New York's "long arm"
statute similar to this provision was at issue in the Rosen6 case and was approved
blatt"
by the Supreme Court.
In addition, the provision will support jurisdiction when
the act or omission occurs in Wyoming but the resulting injury
occurs outside the state."7 Court decisions dealing with similar
statutes in other states, such as Smyth v. Twin State Improve35. Erlanger Mills v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956).
36. Rosenblatt v. American Cyanamid Co., supra note 24.
37. 9B

UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 311

(1966).
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ment Corp." (cited with approval by the Supreme Court in
McGee v. InternationalLife Ins. Co. 9 ) and Nelson v. Miller"
have been primarily concerned with where the act causing
the injury occurred, rather than with where the injury resulted. It should be noted, however, that case law applicable to
this provision is complex and somewhat misleading. This is
because many states have included this provision in their
"long arm" statute but have omitted the provision concerning
inj'ury in the state caused by an act or omission outside the
state.4 ' As a result, the courts of those states have found it
necessary to stretch this provision to include virtually all
tort cases.
The wisdom of the Wyoming Legislature in avoiding this
pitfall is to be commended. Under this provision of the Wyoming "long arm" statute personal jurisdiction over nonresidents can be asserted in two situations: (1) an act or
omission in the state causes tortious injury in the state, (2) an
act or omission in the state causes tortious injury outside
the state.
CAUSING ToRTious INJURY IN THIS STATE BY AN ACT
OR OMISSION OUTSIDE THIs STATE

This provision authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction
when the tortious act or omission takes place outside the state
but the injury occurs within the state, provided, however, that
the non-resident has had other contacts with the forum.2 The
additional contacts need not be related to the cause of action
upon which the suit is based but, of course, the claim for
relief must relate to the tortious act causing the injury. 8
According to the statute the necessary additional contacts
exist if the non-resident (1) regularly does, or solicits business, or (2) engages in any persistent course of conduct, or
(3) derives substantial revenue from goods consumed or services used in this state.
There has been a wide divergence of judicial decision in
other states concerning the constitutionality of "long arm"
38.
39.
40.
41.

116 Vt. 568, 80 A.2d 664 (1951).
355 U.S. 220 (1957).
11 I11.2d 278, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
See discussion, infra, p. 244-48.

42. 9B UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 312 (1966).

43. Id.
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statute provisions dealing with tortious acts and injuries. This
is primarily due to the fact that many "long arm" statutes
do not require contacts other than the occurrence of an injury
within the forum state. As a result, a question arises concerning the existence of contacts sufficient to meet the requirements of due process as set forth in InternationalShoe."
There is very little question about the constitutionality of
this provision in the Wyoming statute in view of the "additional contacts" required. This is particularly true in view
of the fact that courts have often emphasized the existence
of similar contacts in upholding jurisdiction based upon an
in-state injury caused by an out of state act. 5 In fact it is
suggested that in order to accomplish the "long arm" statute's
purpose of broadening jurisdiction to the constitutional limits
set by International Shoe, the three "additional contacts"
should be liberally construed. Another approach is to follow
the lead of Colorado in Lichina v. Futura,Inc.4 6 In that case
the court held that the contacts with Colorado were insufficient under a provision similar to section 5-4.2(a) (iv) but
sustained jurisdiction on the ground that the foreign corporation had been "transacting" business in the state and was,
therefore, within the purview of a Colorado provision similar
to 5-4.2(a) (i).
Actions falling within section 5-4.2(a) (iv) are typically
products liability cases. The Colorado case of Vandermee v.
District Court 7 is an excellent example of what constitutes
a "persistent course of conduct" within the meaning of this
provision. A Colorado construction worker was injured as a
result of a defect in a crane being used on a Colorado construction site. The crane had been manufactured in New York by
a Delaware corporation and sent to Colorado where the defect
resulted in injury to the plaintiff. The court cited Gray v.
44. See, e.g., Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill.2d
432, 176 N.E.2d '761 (1961); Keekler v. Brookwood Country Club, 248
F. Supp. 645 (Ill. 1965); Golden Gate Hop Ranch, Inc. v. Velsicol Chemical
Corp., 66 Wash.2d 469, 403 P.2d 351 (1965) upholding jurisdiction on
constitutional grounds; Lichina v. Futura, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 252 (D. Colo.
1966); Newman v. Charles S. Nathan, Inc., 24 App. Div. 2d 867, 264
N.Y.S.2d 382 (1965) denying jurisdiction on constitutional grounds.
45. Ford Motor Co. v. Arguello, 382 P.2d 886 (Wyo. 1963); Deveny v. Rheem
Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963); Aftanase v. Economy Baler Co.,
343 F.2d 187 (8th Cir. 1965); Ewing v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 202 F.
Supp. 216 (D. Minn. 1962).
46. 260 F. Supp. 252 (D. Colo. 1966).
47. 433 P.2d 335 (Colo. 1967).
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4 8 the leading authority for the constituAmerican Radiator,
tionality of this provision of the statute, and stated that there
existed "minimal contact in Colorado because defendant has
set up channels of sales promotion and distribution in Colorado for the purpose of selling its products in Colorado.""

Specific mention should be made of the third "additional
contact "-deriving substantial revenue from goods consumed
or services used in this state. Any large producer of consumer
goods will derive substantial revenue from virtually every
state. These goods may be sent into the state by a wholesaler
or other distributor completely independent of the manufacturer, but the manufacturer will be deriving revenue, if
only indirectly, from the goods sold within the state. This
is sufficient to render him liable under this provision.
HAVING

AN

INTEREST IN, USING OR POSSESSING

REAL PROPERTY IN THIS STATE

This provision is confined to actions arising from the
ownership of an interest in, use, or possession of real property.
The concept of possession of real property is well established
and presents no serious problems with respect to the "long
arm" statute. According to the Restatement of Torts, a person is in possesion of land if: (a) he is occupying the land
with intent to control it; (b) he has been occupying the land
but is no longer doing so and no other person has since
obtained possession; or (c) he has the right to occupy the
land and no other person is doing so." This definition is broad
enough to include adverse possessors, lessees, or persons who
hold legal title to the land.
What constitutes "using" real property is less clear.
In Dubin v. City of Philadelphia,1 the court held that a
mortgagee, in possession of the property and collecting rent,
was using the property. Chang v. Faul 2 held that a nonresident building contractor came under the statute because
he was using the property on which he was building pursuant
to contract. The courts have generally construed the term
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

22 I1.2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
Lichina v. Futura, Inc., supra note 44, at 388.
RESTATEMENT Op TORTS § 157, at 276 (1965).
34 Pa. D. & C. 61 (1938).
88 Pa. D. & C. 557 (1954).
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"using real property" liberally. This is in keeping with the
purpose of the "long arm" statute.
The situation becomes somewhat more complicated when
deciding what amounts to an "interest in" real property.
Porterv. Nahas,"3 an Illinois case, held that a lease constitutes
an interest in real property. As already mentioned, a lessee
is also a possessor and in most situations, a possessor will be
using the property and will also have an interest in that
property.
However, there are a few unique situations where a person
could have an interest in property without having possession
or use of the property. One such situation would be where a
non-resident contracts to purchase real property within the
state. He would not yet be in possession nor would he be
using the land. The only way the courts of Wyoming could
acquire jurisdiction over such a person would be by concluding that he has an interest in real property within the state.
The question would be whether a contract to purchase land
gives a non-resident vendee an interest in the land. Where
there is a contract to purchase land, "the contract creates a
status of vendor-purchaser and the latter acquires real rights
in the property due to the possibility of specific performance.''" Since an "interest is any right in the nature of
property less than title, "" a contract to buy land gives an
interest in that land. Under the "long arm" statute, if a
non-resident has an interest in real property in Wyoming,
he is subject to in personam jurisdiction of the courts. This
has great repercussions upon the remedies available in such
a case. Under this provision, a resident is able to bring an
action for damages for breach of a contract having to do with
the land and, even more significantly, for specific performance.

6

An interesting question arises concerning the time when
the relationship of the defendant with the property should
exist. In Gearhartv. Pulakos"7 the court held that a sale of
the property after the cause of action arose does not defeat
53. 35 Ill. App. 2d. 360, 182 N.E.2d 915 (1962).
54.
55.

CRIBBET, PRINCIPALS OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 137 (1962).
THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY § 2395, at 149 (1957).

56. Otis Oil & Gas Corp. v. Maier, 284 P.2d 653 (Wyo. 1955).
57. 207 F. Supp. 369 (W.D. Pa. 1962).
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jurisdiction even if the sale was completed before service of
process. However, if the owner of land creates a hazardous
condition on the land but sells it before an injury occurs,
jurisdiction cannot be maintained. 8
There is little question about the constitutionality of the
provision due to the substantial connection of the land with
the situs state. Similar provisions have been upheld since the
1930's, long before the advent of "long arm" statutes, and
have never been overturned by the Supreme Court.
CONTRACTING TO

INSURE ANY PERSON, PROPERTY, OR Risx

LOCATED WITHIN TiIS STATE AT THE TIME OF CONTRACTING.

In addition to adopting this provision in the "long arm"
statute, 9 the Wyoming Legislature recodified the Wyoming
Insurance Code." Section 26.1-233 of the Insurance Code
states that the purpose of the Unauthorized Insurers Process
Act is to protect Wyoming residents by subjecting to the
jurisdiction of Wyoming courts unauthorized insurers who
have delivered policies in the state or sent advertising into
the state. Section 26.1-235 provides for appointment of the
Secretary of State as agent for service of process upon any
unauthorized insurer who solicits, effectuates, or delivers an
insurance contract within this state or performs within the
state any other service or transaction connected with such
insurance. It is apparent that in order to base jurisdiction
upon the Insurance Code the unauthorized insurer must have
performed an act, however insignificant, within the state.
The "long arm" statute, however, subjects a non-resident
insurer to jurisdiction if he contracts to insure a person,
property, or risk within the state. The insurer need not perform any act in Wyoming. All that is necessary is that the
person, property, or risk insured be located in the state at
the time of contracting.6 1
Together, the Insurance Code and the "long arm" statute
give Wyoming broad jurisdictional authority over foreign
58. Murphy v. Indovina, 384 Pa. 26, 119 A.2d 258 (1956).
59. 9B UNIFORW LAWS ANN. 813 (1966). This provision is to be treated as
part of the regulatory scheme for the insurance industry in Wyoming.
60. WYO. STAT. §§ 26.1-1 to -669 (1957).
61. Constitutionally, even this limitation may be unnecessary in view of Clay
v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964). In that case the Supreme
Court upheld jurisdiction of a Florida court over a non-resident insurer
where the owner of the insured property moved into Florida bringing
the property with him. The loss occurred in Florida.
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insurers. The Insurance Code requires some act in the state
but does not require that a contract be made. The "long arm"
statute requires that a contract be made but does not require
an act in the state. Thus, virtually all insurance activity is
covered by the two statutes.
WHEN JURISDICTION OVER A PERSON IS BASED SOLELY UPON

THIS SECTION, ONLY A CLAIM FOR RELIEF ARISING FROM ACTS
ENUMERATED IN THIS SECTION MAY BE ASSERTED AGAINST HIm.

As has been pointed out previously, the purpose of the
"long arm" statute is to expand personal jurisdiction to the
constitutional limits established by the United States Supreme
Court. However, in accomplishing this worthwhile goal care
must be taken to insure that the statute does not become a
tool of oppression. Because of the desirability of settling an
entire dispute in a single litigation whenever possible, the
concept of claim for relief should be broadly construed. On
the other hand, assertion of independent claims unrelated to
claims for relief provided for in subsection (a) of the statute
must be prevented. 2 This is the purpose of subsection (b)."
In the absence of this provision certain constitutional problems of due process could arise.
This limitation does not apply in all situations. A defendant, of course, may appear and consent to unlimited jurisdiction if he prefers to litigate all aspects of a related dispute,
the provision notwithstanding. In addition, the limitation
imposed does not apply if jurisdiction is based on grounds
other than the "long arm" statute. For example, under the
Wyoming Business Corporation Act, if a person is "doing
business" within the terms of the act, it appears that he may
be subjected to jurisdiction even if the claim for relief does
not arise from the business being done.
WHEN THE EXERCISE OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION IS AUTHOR1IZED BY THIS ACT, SERVICE MAY BE MADE OUTSIDE THIS STATE

This section authorizes service of process outside Wyoming, as provided for in the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure (1966) when personal jurisdiction is based upon the
62. Murphy v. Indovina, supra note 58, at 313. For an example of the application of this requirement see 339 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1964).
63. Murphy v. Indovina, supra note 58, at 314.
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"long arm" statute. Rule 4(c) enumerates the persons by
whom service of process may be made within Wyoming, in
another state or United States territory, and in a foreign
country. Generally, a sheriff or his deputy or person over
twenty-one years of age appointed by the clerk may serve
process. Rule 4(d) provides for the manner of serving process upon individuals over fourteen years of age, individuals
under fourteen years of age, partnerships or other unincorporated associations, corporations, governmental departments or agencies, and the Secretary of State.
Although the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure do not
specifically state the manner in which personal service of
process upon non-residents is to be made, it may be reasonably inferred that the procedure provided for in Rule 4(c)
and 4(d) is appropriate.6 . It is suggested that the Supreme
Court of Wyoming could resolve this question by changing
the rules to provide for personal service of process upon
non-residents outside the state.
This provision of the "long arm" statute also provides
for proof of process according to the laws of the place in
which service is made, or according to any order of the court.
Although the procedural rules of most states are similar to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, care should be taken
in looking for differences. If service is not made properly,
jurisdiction is not acquired.
RETROACTIVITY

With regards to the question of the retroactive application of the "long arm" statute, the cases appear to be
divided into three general classifications: (1) the act or
transaction upon which jurisdiction is based occurred prior
to the enactment of the statute but the action is initiated
after enactment; (2) action is initiated prior to the enactment
of the statute and enactment occurs before final disposition
of the case; (3) the elements of the cause of action occur in
part prior to enactment of the statute and in part after
enactment.
64.

Service of process, to meet the standard of due process, must be the method
most likely to "appraise interested parties of the pendency of the action
and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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In the first class of cases a distinction has been made
between implied consent statutes and statutes, such as Wyoming's, which provide that the acts or transactions specified
therein are the bases of jurisdiction of local courts.6 5 A substantial majority of courts have held that the general rule
that statutes pertaining to procedure operate retroactively
applies to "long arm" statutes of the first kind but does not
apply to the second kind.
In McGee v. International Life Ins. Co."6 the Supreme
Court held that, although an insurance contract had been
issued and delivered prior to enactment of the statute, the
statute was remedial and its application neither enlarged or
impaired the insurance company's substantive rights or obligations under the contract, but merely provided the insured
with a California forum to enforce whatever substantive
rights he might have. The Court stated that the company
did not have a vested right not to be sued in California and
pointed out that it was given a reasonable time to appear
and defend on the merits of the suit.
A vast majority of courts have followed the reasoning
in McGee in holding that a "long arm" statute enacted after
accrual of the cause of action but before suit has been brought
may be applied. 7
A different situation exists, however, when the action
was initiated prior to enactment of the statute. In the absence
of statutory provisions to the contrary it has been held that
the statutes may not be applied retroactively under those
circumstances. 8 A leading case in this area is Simonson v.
InternationalBank." The court pointed out that the "long
arm'' statute cannot be applied retroactively so as to make
good a service of process which was jurisdictionally defective
when made. It then went on to make the distinction between
65. See, e.g., Chovan v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 217 F. Supp. 808 (E.D.
Mich. 1963); Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc.,
15 N.Y.2d 443, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 209 N.E.2d 68 (1965).
66. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
67. See, e.g., Hoen v. District Court, 159 Colo. 451, 412 P.2d 428 (1966); Smith
v, Putnam, 250 F. Supp. 1017 (D. Colo. 1965); State ex rel. Johnson v.
District Court of Fourth Judicial District, 417 P.2d 109 (Mont. 1966);
Roberts v. Hodges, 401 S.W.2d 332 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966); Simonson v.
International Bank, 14 N.Y.2d 281, 200 N.E.2d 427 (1964).
68. See, e.g., Cedar Rapids Community School Dist. v. R. F. Ball Construction
Co., 237 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Iowa 1965).
69. 14 N.Y.2d 281, 251 N.Y.S.2d 433, 200 N.E.2d 427.
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actions which were initiated before enactment of the statute
and those which were initiated after enactment.
The third class of cases are those wherein part of the
elements of the cause of action occurred prior to enactment
and part occurred after enactment. In this situation it has
been generally held that the cause of action sued on did not
fully accrue until after enactment of the statute and that,
therefore, the statute is applicable. °
CONCLUSION

The evolution of the law relative to personal jurisdiction
has resulted in an entirely new legal doctrine. From the
physical power theory as set forth in Pennoyer v. Neff, to
the fictions of consent, presence, and doing business, to the
"minimal contacts" theory of InternationalShoe and finally
to the judicial decisions based on InternationalShoe, the trend
toward expanding personal jurisdiction is clear. Subsequent
to the InternationalShoe, decision, which broadened the constitutional limitations of due process, many states which had
statutes based on the old concepts found that these statutes
fell far short of the jurisdictional barriers. Many state courts
attempted to rectify this situation by re-interpreting existing
law. However, this solution proved inadequate. In 1955, ten
years after the Supreme Court handed down its decision in
International Shoe, the state of Illinois enacted the first
"long arm" statute. During ensuing years other states
followed suit.
In 1967 Wyoming adopted its "long arm" statute which
is patterned after the Uniform International and Interstate
ProcedureAct. The purpose of this act is to permit Wyoming
courts to go to the full constitutional limits of due process,
thus assuring Wyoming jurisdiction over cases having substantial Wyoming interest. The principal beneficiaries of
the act are Wyoming residents, inasmuch as a resident who
has a claim for relief against a foreign corporation or nonresident individual arising out of events which create minimal
contacts with the state is given greater access to Wyoming
courts. The restriction of minimal contacts and the require70. See, e.g., Sampson Constr. Co. v. Farmers Co-operative Elevator Co., 382
F.2d 645 (10th Cir. 1967).
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ment that the claim for relief must arise under the statute
insures that, while the plaintiff may bring his action in a
convenient forum, at the same time, jurisdiction obtained
under the statute is fair to the defendant.
It is hoped that in interpreting the "long arm" statute
Wyoming courts will recognize the interest of the state and
its citizens in expanding personal jurisdiction over nonresidents to the full constitutional limits and will effectuate
the purpose of the statute to that end.
EDWARD A. LEWKOWSKI
V. FRANK MENDICINO
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